Trademark Scope

"It is doubtful whether the Uniform Policy is applicable to this dispute. Although it is accepted that the Complainant is world famous under the name STING, it does not follow that he has rights in STING as a trademark or service mark. Unlike the personal names in issue in the cases Julia Fiona Roberts v Russell Boyd, Jeannette Winterson v Mark Hogarth, and Steven Rattner v BuyThisDomainName (John Pepin), the personal name in this case is also a common word in the English language, with a number of different meanings. The following are the entries for “sting” from Merriam - Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary: sting vb stung ; sting.ing [ME, fr. OE stingan; akin to ON stinga to sting and prob. to Gk stachys spike of grain, stochos target, aim] vt (bef. 12c) 1: to prick painfully: as a: to pierce or wound with a poisonous or irritating process b: to affect with sharp quick pain or smart “hail stung their faces” 2: to cause to suffer acutely “stung with remorse” 3: overcharge, cheat ~ vi 1: to wound one with or as if with a sting 2: to feel a keen burning pain or smart; also: to cause such pain – sting.ing.ly adv sting n (bef. 12c) 1 a: the act of stinging; specif: the thrust of a stinger into the flesh b: a wound or pain caused by or as if by stinging 2: stinger 2 3: a sharp or stinging element, force, or quality 4: an elaborate confidence game; specif: such a game worked by undercover police in order to trap criminals\n\nIn light of the fact that the word “sting” is in common usage in the English language, with a number of meanings, this case can be distinguished from the other cases cited above in which the Complainants’ personal name was found also to be an unregistered trademark or service mark to which the Uniform Policy applies. This Administrative Panel is inclined to the view, therefore, that the Complainant’s name STING is not a trademark or service mark within the scope of paragraph 4(a)(i) of the Uniform Policy. However, it is not necessary to reach a formal decision on this issue, because this Administrative Panel finds against the Complainant on other grounds, namely that the requirement of paragraph 4(a)(iii) is not met, as discussed below."