"132 declare by judicial fiat what is right and what should be done, under the facts in this case, such action under our form of constitutional government where the three branches each have their defined jurisdiction and power, would be an intrusion of judicial egoism over legislative passivity.” The legislature has recently acted in this area. Chapter 354, Laws of 1981 (effective May 7, 1982), was enacted to provide the underlying legislation enabling local governments to enact ordinances establishing procedures for guaranteeing access to sunlight. This court’s intrusion into an area where legislative action is being taken is unwarranted, and it may undermine a legislative scheme for orderly development not yet fully operational. [Judge Callow excerpts statutory provisions prohibiting certain light blockage but only according to a permit scheme and with notice to neighboring owners.] This legislative scheme would deal with the type of problem presented in the present case and precludes the need for judicial activism in this area. I examine with interest the definition of nuisance as set out in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and adopted in the majority opinion: “A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private use and enjoyment of land.” Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 821D (1977) (emphasis added). The majority believes that the defendan t’s obstruction of the plaintiff’s access to sunlight falls within the broad definition of “use and enjoyment of land.” Supra , at 187-188. I do not believe the defendant’s “obstruction” of the plaintiff’s access to sunlight falls within the definition of “invasion,” as it applies to the private use and enjoyment of land. Invasion is typically synonymous with “entry,” “attack,” “penetration,” “hostile entrance,” “the incoming or spread of something unusually hurtful.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary , 1188 (1966). Most of the nuisance cases arising"