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Whale Custom

Whale Custom (Property · I think clearly) — "Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) H. M. Knowlton, for libellant. H. H. Harriman, for respondent. N ELSON , D.…

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  • Ghen v. Rich concerns ownership of a fin-back whale recovered after it was killed at sea.
  • The libellant seeks the value of the whale’s blubber and oil from the respondent.
  • The case arises from the established fin-back whaling industry around Cape Cod.
  • Fin-back whales sink when killed, later rise to the surface, and may be recovered in several ways.
  • The whales are difficult to capture and the business requires specialized equipment, skill, capital, and physical hardship.
  • Local usage treats the person who kills the whale in the customary manner as its owner.
  • Each crew marks its lances, allowing the killer of a whale to be identified.
  • The libellant shot and instantly killed the whale with a bomb-lance on April 9, 1880.
  • The whale later stranded seventeen miles away, and Ellis sold it to the respondent without notifying the Provincetown owner.
  • The parties rely on opposing positions concerning the validity of the local usage.
  • The libellant claims title under the long-standing Cape Cod usage.
  • The respondent argues that the usage is invalid and that the sale transferred the whale’s value to him.
  • Earlier whale-ownership decisions address when killing and possession establish property rights.
  • In Taber v. Jenny, a killed whale remained the captors’ property when it was anchored and marked with clear signs of appropriation.
  • In Bartlett v. Budd, ownership vested in the captors after they killed and took actual possession of a whale, even though it later drifted away.
  • The cited decisions state that a whale becomes property when the taker establishes firm and complete possession.
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Whale Custom

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"Ghen v. Rich, 8 F. 159 (D. Mass. 1881) H. M. Knowlton, for libellant. H. H. Harriman, for respondent. N ELSON , D. J. This is a libel to recover the value of a fin-back whale. The libellant lives in Provincetown and the respondent in Wellfleet. The facts, as they appeared at the hearing, are as follows: In the early spring months the easterly part of Massachusetts bay is frequented by the species of whale known as the fin-back whale. Fishermen from Provincetown pursue them in open boats from the shore, and shoot them with bomb-lances fired from guns made expressly for the purpose. When killed they sink at once to the bottom, but in the course of from one to three days they rise and float on the surface. Some of them are picked up by vessels and towed into Provincetown. Some float ashore at high water and are left stranded on the beach as the tide recedes. Others float out to sea and are never recovered. The person who happens to find them on the beach usually sends word to Provincetown, and the owner comes to the spot and removes the blubber. The finder usually receives a small salvage for his services. Try-works are established in Provincetown for trying out the oil. The business is of considerable extent, but, since it requires skill and experience, as well as some outlay of capital, and is attended with great exposure and hardship, few persons engage in it. The average yield of oil is about 20 barrels to a whale. It swims with great swiftness, and for that reason cannot be taken by the harpoon and line. Each boat’s crew engaged in the business has its peculiar mark or device on its lances, and in this way it is known by whom a whale is killed. The usage on Cape Cod, for many years, has been that the person who kills a whale in the manner and under the circumstances described, owns it, and this right has never been disputed until this case. The libellant has been engaged in this business for ten years past. On the morning of April 9, 1880, in Massachusetts bay, near the end of Cape Cod, he shot and instantly killed with a bomb-lance the whale in question. It sunk immediately, and on the morning of the 12th was found stranded on the beach in Brewster, within the ebb and flow of the tide, by one Ellis, 17 Miles from the spot where it was killed. Instead of sending word to Provincetown, as is customary, Ellis advertised the whale for sale at auction, and sold it ot the respondent, who shipped off the blubber and tried out the oil. The 183 libellant heard of the finding of the whale on the morning of the 15th, and immediately sent one of his boa t’s crew to the place and claimed it. Neither the respondent nor Ellis knew the whale had been killed by the libellant, but they knew or might have known, if they had wished, that it had been shot and killed with a bomb- lance, by some person engaged in this species of business. The libellant claims title to the whale under this usage. The respondent insists that this usage is invalid. It was decided by Judge Sprague, in Taber v. Jenny , 1 Sprague, 315, that when a whale has been killed, and is anchored and left with marks of appropriation, it is the property of the captors; and if it is afterwards found, still anchored, by another ship, there is no usage or principle of law by which the property of the original captors is diverted, even though the whale may have dragged from its anchorage. The learned judge says: When the whale had been killed and taken possession of by the boat of the Hillman, (the first taker,) it became the property of the owners of that ship, and all was done which was the practicable in order to secure it. They left it anchored, with unequivocal marks of appropriation. In Bartlett v. Budd , 1 Low. 223, the facts were these: The first officer of the libellant’s ship killed a whale in the Okhotsk sea, anchored it, attached a waif to the body, and then left it and went ashore at some distance for the night. The next morning the boats of the respondent’s ship found the whale adrift, the anchor not holding, the cable coiled round the body, and no waif or irons attached to it. Judge 184 Lowell held that, as the libellants had killed and taken actual possession of the whale, the ownership vested in them. In his opinion the learned judge says: A whale, being ferae naturae , does not become property until a firm possession has been established by the taker. But when such possession has become firm and complete, the right of property is clear, a"

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